The G-7 summit held in Hiroshima (Japan) this weekend has been a highly relevant political event. The group of large advanced democracies has issued its messages, especially directed at China, Russia and the global south. In the most relevant elements, the consensus position is much closer to the EU’s approaches than to those that were in force in Washington until recently.
As for China, the conclusions have sent a strong message to Beijing, much harsher than at other summits, but firmly anchored in the conceptual territory of reducing risks, an idea sponsored by the EU, and far from the decoupling that was in vogue. in the United States until recently.
Regarding Russia, the final statement points to a new twist in the restriction of exports to the country led by Vladimir Putin, but nothing similar to the general ban with some exceptions promoted by Washington in April, according to the Bloomberg agency. The European partners —and also Japan—, were opposed, and the agreement has ended in an expansion of the restrictions, but far from it a dry cut with sectoral exceptions. On the other hand, Washington’s turn on the F-16 fighters for Ukraine also responds to pressure from European countries.
Regarding the global south, European sources indicated that a consensus has been established around the idea that, in the relationship with this heterogeneous group of countries, it is better to choose to seek harmony within the framework of respect for the principles of the UN , such as sovereignty and territorial integrity, instead of stepping on the accelerator in the rhetoric of the democratic front opposed to territorial regimes, also widely used on the other side of the Atlantic.
These elements do not prevent Washington from continuing to press to rebalance different chapters in directions of its choice, nor from remaining areas of serious friction between the United States and the EU, such as those motivated by industrial protectionism in the green sector of the White House.
On the other hand, within the EU itself there are different sensitivities, and some countries, especially on the eastern flank, agree more with many of Washington’s positions than with the approaches of the majority in the Union.
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But the Hiroshima summit has shown a clear will of the Seven to show cohesion before the world, and that consensus has landed in a place very close to the main lines of the EU on the main issues.
China’s “economic coercion”
The case of China is perhaps the most obvious. The conclusions have strongly criticized Beijing for its practices of “economic coercion” through which, according to the partners, it seeks to interfere in the sovereignty of others, or for the militarization of disputed waters. The group has activated mechanisms to counter these coercive practices or to better control exports and investments to that country. There is enough to make China react angrily to the steps taken by the G-7.
But the document has crystallized the idea, very European, that, although there is no room for naivete before Beijing, this has to be a surgical process. A pragmatic and studied action to reduce risks, both those linked to the excessive dependence on Chinese manufacturing, which can expose them to blackmail, and those connected with the possibility that China uses Western technologies for hostile or threatening advances. But not a disengagement maneuver, a word that until recently was on the way to becoming a mantra in a US Congress where firmness against China seems to have become the only bipartisan consensus.
As for Russia’s war in Ukraine, the opening of the path to deliver the F-16s to Kiev responds to a long period of pressure from several European countries, including some from the EU that have these devices and seem willing to deliver them -such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium-, others that do not have them, such as France, and others from outside the EU, such as the United Kingdom.
The G-7 was, for a period, a blurry body. The loss of relative weight due to the rise of powerful emerging powers was shrinking its relevance. The 2008 crisis gave way to the growing importance of the G-20.
Now, the challenge to the international order embodied by the invasion of Ukraine and the growing tension between advanced democracies and China has once again given it a clear raison d’être. This year, the partners’ conclusions have shed light on a consensus very close to the European starting positions. Time will tell if this roadmap will be maintained and, on that basis, the attempt to connect with emerging countries that has been attempted will be successful.
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